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In the :Jiatter of the Estate of
JA"JIES JOH~ LATSIS (sometimes
known as "Latses"),

Case No. 7954

Deceased.

PETITION OF RESPONDENT
UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY
FOR REHEARING AND FOR CLARIFICATION

This petition by this Respondent, who is now charged
to proceed as administrator by the opinion of the Court
herein, will present serious errors in the opinion herein,
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as \Vell as suggestions for assistance of the trial Court,
and in the further administration, if that would still be
necessary.
To now take up the administration which \Yas discontinued, if not concluded, by what the opinion designates ''the decree of distribution and order discharging
the administrator," entered Octiber 9, 1945, will certainly
present difficulties, and some of these may be avoided
by reexamination of the opinion, or by clarification as
suggested herein.
We accept our share of responsibility for some of
the errors we now complain of, because we attempted to
follow the order of appellants' brief and therefore did
not present our points effectively, or in the order of their
importance. We thought at the time this way might be
more convenient to the Court.
We did, however, attempt, as did the trial Court, to
prevent some of the confusion and difficulty now involved here by trying to have the complainants' case presented by complaint in equity, with proper parties, and
with the issues defined, as the Rules require.
Our points in support hereof are now presented in
order with a separate supporting memo following each
point, as follows:

I.
It seems to be an error of importance here that
this Court did not decide the question raised by our
motion to dismiss (R. 153) and decided by the trial
Court. The trial Court ruled ( R. 205) that the
2
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attempted procedure by petition was not proper
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and certain express statutes, and the decisions of this Court. The
only matter presented to this Oourt for decision
therefore was whether this was the proper way to
proceed. That question is not discussed or decided in
the opinion.
MEMO SUPPORTING I.

As a n1atter of procedure not only may matters of
"mistakes in settlement" after discharge be presented
only "by an action in equity" (75-14-23); and, Rule 60-b
says "any relief fron1 a judgment" after three months
''shall be * * * by an independent action.'' And this rule
allows the Court to ''entertain such a:ction * * * to relieve
a party from a judgment * * * for fraud upon the Court,''
and then also of course (75-1-7) as to real property where
administrator is appointed, as here, "no objection to
any subsequent order or decree * * * can be taken * * *
on account of any * * * defect or irregularity * * * other
than on direct application * * * at any ,time before distribution, or on appeal." Appellants' petition is an "objection" based on a "defect," if it is anything.
But even more vital is the fact that this opinion
is ineffective because it can not possibly restore the
former property of the estate to the custody of the
administrators or the trial Court for further probate.
This of course applies to the personal property, and to
money paid out by order of Court to petitioners' attorney
representative or others, but particularly applies to the
3
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nine parcels of real estate (R. 129) which immediately
passed into private hands more than eight years ago.
In fact, appellants, before this appeal, filed an
action in the Third District Court by complaint, a certified eopy of which we understand has been .presented
to this Court, with William Latsis and Sigmund Helwing,
Administrator, et al, as plaintiffs, and 32 defendants, in
which it is alleged that the plaintiffs and all these defendants claim or assert some right or interest in some
portions of these former estate properties.
Furthermore, the procedure here, by petitions, which
met the trial Court's objection, can not and does not seek
to divest any owner or claimant of any right. If such
challenge could be made by petition, it is not made as
against anyone, not even the widow. She and this Respondent are here, as indicated by the Court's opinion,
only by complaint of their conduct as administrators.
It must be evident therefore that this opinion can
not have any effect to restore the status existing when
the estate was closed. Isn't this a futile and fruitless, if
not in fact an unauthorized, procedure?
The possibility of actions by administrators to repossess some or all of the properties may not be entirely
precluded, but such suits could be numerous •and long
drawn out, and, because of factual situations as referred
to under the next point, could fail. According to a theory
advanced by appellants here, eac;h of these foreign heirs
is entitled to claim a small fractional interest in eaeh
piece of real property amounting to the proportion which
his claim bears to the total of all other interests. 'Vhilr
4
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this could seiTe to con1plicate things even more here, it
doesn't seem to be sound or to have been adopted by
the Court. ~\s we pointed out in our brief (p. 35), any
percentage interest of any one appellant is very small
here, and no such interest would haYe been of any conceivable benefit.
It is true also that we have other partition statutes
and which, though not as comprehensive or as fittingly
applicable here as 75-14-25-the one used by the trial
Court-nevertheless would permit of sale and which (see
73-12-16) would permit the \\~hole property to be assigned
by the Court to the widow if she would accept and pay
the other parties their just proportion of the value,
or (see 75-12-17) the property may be set off by referees
to any of the parties who will accept it upon similar payment being made to the others. Admittedly, some of the
complications may in this way be aided if not eliminated.
It is substantially the same thing that the Court and the
appellants' attorney representative, did back in 1945.

II.
Another matter of serious irregularity, confusion, and injustice is that this Cour.t by its opinion
has decided the whole case before the evidence is
in. This case is on appeal from the order granting
our motion to dismiss. The defending parties, and all
parties interested in the properties involved, have
not been permitted to plead to .the facts presented by
the appellants' petitions and briefs, or be heard on
the facts pleaded by appellants, or facts to be pleaded
in defense of the probate proceedings heretofore
taken.
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MEMO SUPPORTING II.
The administrators are now treated as defendants in
the opinion, but denied opportunity to defend their
administration. Derogatory allegations in the petitions
may be treated as true for the purpose of our motion
to dismiss, but may not be so treated for the purpose of
final determination of, or to prejudice any future determinations that may be involved.
More seriously, some misstatements of fact found
in appellants' brief are erroneously adopted by the Court
in the opinion, and there are several assumptions of
material facts not alleged, and, of course, not proved. So
that by this summary disposition of this case by this high
Court parties interested in the properties and probate
of this estate cannot hereafter ever be expected successfully to contradict these misstatements and erroneous
assumptions as recited in the opinion, or to ·establish the
0ontrary either in the Court below or in this Court on
· future appeals.
As a separate nwtter of future procedure, should
not we and shmtld not the trial Court know now whether
this Court, by its order to complete "the probate by
further proceedings," intends us to proceed as if all these
things are settled and foreclosed and as if the original
funds and properties are still in the hands of the administrators and the Court, and how this can possibly be
done?
As illustrating our references to conclusions in the
opinion from disputed facts, it is asserted therein that
the partition and distribution by the lower Court resulted
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frmn litigation oyer whether certain properties of the
Yalue of about $1:2,000.00 belonged to the estate or to the
widow. The opinion (p. 3) speaks of "inconvenience and
prejudice" as if such had happened to the appellants
from the settlement and distribution here, anJ speaks
of this as coming "from a dispute as to the amount of
property which should be included in the estate.''
There are a number of factual things like this, which
not only should not be determined without proper hearing, but they gaYe an entirely wrong impression of the
Probate Court's conduct of this orderly probate proceeding, and they have plainly been allowed to influence the
opinion here. These things not only have not been heard,
but they are contrary to what the record now shows
as to the reason or basis for this settlement.
First, the petition for the partition and distribution
(R. 86) was filed before the opinion here says that litigation was abandoned by the widow. Such abandonment, if
any there was, could only have the effect of admitting
that the property in question did belong to the estate,
and, as a matter of fact, the proceeding and order were
had on that basis, and, therefore, appellants were not
at all prejudiced. The petition by their attorney representative and others, said that they were in need and
desired to have their portion of the estate and further
that, "the parties hereto have estimated as best they
can from the appraisals and other information the value
of Raid estate and of the interest of said four heirs and
havr determined the value of their interest at approximate}~' $10,000.00. '' This is fully supported by the evi-
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dence on the hearing (R. 243).
The Prob~te Court directly raised the question (R.
250) as to whether the heirs were making a compromise
stipulation or whether the proposed partition was to be
based upon determination of values, then:
''THE COURT: The point that I make is if
it amounted to considerably more than ten thousand dollars and this \:vas just merely a compromise settlement in order to get it quicker'' MR. COTRO-MANES: No, no.
''THE COURT: Or avoid litigation, or something of that nature, that is ·one thing, but if thi~
is an approximation as nearly as you can reach, of
·what they would receive upon final distribution''MR. MULLINER: That is right.
''MR. COTRO-MANES: That will be about
it, your honor. I will state to the court further
if it were not for certain litigation that we had,
probably we would never have got any settlement
at all. We might have eventually received some
money.''
Then (R. 252) :
''MR. COTRO-MANES: So that $12,000 we
are not concerned with that now.
"THE COURT: The only matter which is
before me is the question of approving thi~
$10,000 in settlement of their distributive share.
''MR. COTRO-M:ANES: That is right.
"THE COURT: You represent to me that
that is approximately, as nearl)' a~ you can compute it~
"M~. COTRO-MANES: T·hat i~ right, and in
my judgment it is for the he~t interests of thP~P
heirs.''
So that this if' it. This $10,000.00 \\'a~ '·in settlement
8
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of their distributiYe share," and the ,order (R. 95) then
recites that the an1ount of the agreed settlement ''is a
reasonable ainount to be expected fron1 the estate of the
heirs thereof other than Virginia Latsis, and considering
the properties of the decedent * * * . ''
And then the administrators ''are authorized and directed to pay and distribute" the said amount ratably to the heirs
named (R. 96) such "distribution" to be made
through the Hellenic Bank or American Express,
''whichever source is selected by the above mentioned attorney for the heirs, and that the issuance and delivery of checks to such source shall
relieve administrators herein from further responsibility therefor.''
Thus the Court not only acted pursuant to the language
of the statute, but uses the language of the statue as to
it being a "distribution."
We can't, of course, anticipate all the facts that may
be properly raised if this case were tried ,on the petitions
and responsive pleadings, but we know from connection
with it that many factual matters affecting the rights of
parties will be foreclosed or prejudiced by this premature
adjudication. The false allegations by appellants of
their lack of knowledge of the probate proceedings here,
and facts of their O\Vn laches and acquiescence in this
proceeding with actual as well as constructive knowledge,
as well as all the facts affecting their rights to have an
adverse determination of titles to real estate which has
been held and occupied adversely for nearly nine years
now, should all be allowed to be pleaded and to be fairly
tried.
9
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Other factual matters assumed without proof appear
under Point V infra.

III.
The Court has seriously erred in refusing to
apply the plain language of 75-14-25, U.C.A., and by
mistaken comparison with other and different
statutes, and different proceedings in other jurisdictions, has destroyed its further use, or any future
dependence on this statute in cases like this, and has
left all titles dependent on its use in doubt, even
though its validity or proper application was here in
no way presented in issue herein.
MEMO SUPPORTING III.
The appointment or authority of their attorney
representative under this statute is not questioned here,
but is affirmatively alleged by appellants (R. 84) who, in
fact, recognize throughout that the attorney represented
these heirs as therein provided, and had presented the
petition and evidence upon which the settlement and
distribution 'vas determined and n1ade; and they also
allege that the attorney assumed the duty of distribution
of the fund as ordered, and undertook this (R. 190).
No jssue as to limitation of his powers or tlt<'
power of the Court as now decided, was ever intimated in
a pleading, but was suggested only in the reply brief
of appellants filed August 23, 1953, after the case had been
briefed and set for argument, and nine and one-half
years after the appointment. Nothing of this wa~ hdon•
the trial Court on it:-; ruling presented to this Court for
review; nor here presented eitlwr in the Point~ relie1l
10
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upon as filPll, or ns set forth in appellants' brief.
Furthermore, the appellants misled the Court by
erroneonsl:- treating the proceedings taken pursuant to
the authority giYen the Court and the attorney representatiYe by the express language of the statute itself,
as "stipulating away appellants' rights" or stipulating
to ''preclude them'' frmn claiming their share of the
estate, and by charging their attorney as having
"waived" their rights.
So the Court (p. 3) cites and quotes some such
language as this from a California case (66 Pac. 30). We
very respectfully point out, that this case involved absolutely nothing that is in our case here, and nothing that
is in our statute, and there is nothing to indicate that
California has a statute involving the applicable language
in our statute, and certainly no" similar statute" is cited
or indicated. The dicta quoted in the opinion here was
used in connection with the lower Court's attempt to pay
out of protestants' share of an estate, attorney's fees
to the Court appointed attorney for services while the
protestants were, in fact, being represented by attorneys
employed by themselves, after the period of appointment
of the former attorney had expired. There is not the remotest similarity in the applicable law or facts.
This seems, therefore, to be not only a wholly gratuitious opinion on this, but also a terrifically drastic ·offhand way to destroy a State statute which obviously is
important because of the unusual number of immigrant
people here who natura.Ily have foreign heirs.
The orderly procedure taken under this statute was
11
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not a "stipulation" or a "waiver" of anything. True,
there was an agreement as to what would constitute a
fair partition and distribution, and this was recited in
a petition. It was nnt a matter in which the administrators, as such, were directly interested. The procedure, however, washy (1) petition as it had to be, and
then (2) by complete hearing (R. 243-260), the c'omplete
goo'd faith of which has not been and, if fairly examined,
we are sure will not he questioned, and then (3) a partition and distribution were approved and ordered by
the Court. How can 75-14-25 or the authority therein
"for * * * settlements, partitions, and distributions" of
estates and provisions that the attorney is by his appointment "thereby charged to represent" the persons for
whom he is appointed "in all proceedings subsequent
to appointment," ever be used or carried out except
exactly as it was done here, by petibon, hearing, and
order of settlement partition and distribution. No right
was stipulated away because there were no rights beyond
what the Court, having complete jurisdiction, regularly
determined was the value of the interests in the estate,
then partitioned and distributed.
We wish to add that, contrary to the language of
the California Court quoted in that situation, it seems
certain that our District Court under our statute in thi~
matter of partition and distribution may do more with
the aid of the attorney representative properly appointed
thereunder by wa~r of "partition" and "distribution"
than it might do without the use of this statute and
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this appoinhnent, just as the Court with the aid of
referees under our other partition statutes (75-12-12,
16, 17) may make such partitions and distributions by
payn1ents in cash. The legislative authority therefor is
the same.
And here he does not, as there stated, receive "his
authority only from the Court." He receives it and so
does the Court under our statutes from the Legislature,
and certainly succession is all a "matter of legislative
control." And here he obviously is more than a mere
attorney-at-law. He is a statutory representative, with
all the authority the statute clothes him and the Court
with, in these matters.
(See: State v. Dist. Court, 85 P. 1022.)

IV.
The Court has done an unprecedented thing here
by holding, on its own motion, that a decree, which
by its own terms makes final distribution and discharge, is not :a final decree, and that such, after more
than six years, may be collaterally attacked by a
petition in probate, contrary to the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the decisions of this Court as well
as to the Statutes of Utah, as to time and grounds
for such attack.

MEMO SUPPORTING IV.
This decree can not be treated as void before it
is attacked at all, and is therefore plainly not subject
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to collateral attack, or to be treated as a nullity hy the
Court, in violation of its rules and decisions, as well as
the Statutes of the State.
And again, we cannot find that this issue is anywhere alleged in the petitions which are now being
treated as complaints here. These petitions seem to
recognize that the distribution had been made, and
attempt to charge us with fraud or misfeasance in having
n1ade it (R. '156, 172). Certainly, the validity orf the
Decree was not a'n issue before the trial Court or in
the order sustaining our rnotion (R. 153, 205) which
order alone was appealed fro-m.
Should it not be required that before an issue of
this kind and importance can be decided by the Supreme
Court that it must have been properly presented to the
parties, or at least to the Court whose decision is up for
review~ This seems especially important here because
certainly other persons depen'ding ·on this decree for
title to properties will be prejudiced by the opinion
on this, even if it could not actua'lly bind them in future
appeals.
\V e present the point to suggest that the decision
of this matter at all was inappropriate under the eircumstances and for such interpretation and 'future guidance as the Court may co-nsider helpful in this probate
proceeding. \Ve believe it is will taken, but do not aq.?;llP
it further because the very next point, and a most important one, hears upon this ahw.
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v.
The plainly erroneous conclusion that this final
"decree of distribution and order of discharge" in
fact "was conditional" is astoundingly based entirely
on utterly false statements as to what the decree
itself says, as well as on erroneous statements as to
matters already of record here.

ME).IO SUPPORTING V.
\Ve use the term "false" advisedly and correctly,
but knowing, of course, that the Court was misled by
appellants and did not know this to he so. Again on
this point, we have the fact that this vital matter of
decision was not presented in issue in the trial Court
below by the petitions, or was it in issue on our motion
or the Court's order appealed from.
Passing this, we will call attention directly to the
following numbered basic misstatements in the opinion
itself:
Erorr 1 (p. 3):
"***even if the stipulation had been binding it
expressly provided that approval of the settlement by
the court was subject to the heirs accepting payment,
executing the necessary receipts, assigning their interest,
and releasing the estate 'from liability."
(Note (R. 87) that it did not expressly or otherwise
say this, and no party to this petition attempted to, or
could, make the court's order "subject" to anything,
and it wasn't.)
Error 2 (p. 4):

15
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"***that the stipulation and the order confinning
it expressly provided that the heirs are to be bound
only if they accept payment, execute the necessary
receipts, assign their interest and release the estate
from liability, ***"
(Note, that this order neither "expressly" or otherwise says anything about this.)

Error 3 (p. 4) :
''***the decree of distribution approves and inco-rporates the stipulation,***"
(Note that the decree of distribution nowhere mentions the stipulation, let alone approving or incorporating
it, and neither directly or indirectly refers to its contents.)

Error4 (p. 3):
This one refers to the order of Feb. 27, and the
same matters mentioned in Errors 1 and 2, and says:
"This must have been ordered by the court advisedly
and for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of these
foreign heirs."
(Note, that the Court never ordered this at all, or
ever used the expression quoted in Error 1 above (R.
95-97), or any language of like import.)
Error 5 (p. 2) :
This one is doubly important because the above
mentioned errors are based upon it. It purports to
quote, but misstates the language and meaning of a
paragraph of the final Decree, and we capitalize a
statement inserted into the decree a~ follows:
16
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''The settlement, payments and distribution,
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to
the order herein of February 27, 1945 [THE
PETITIO~ .A~D STIPULATION FILED ON
FEBRUARY 13, 1945, HEREINABOVE SET
FORTH] is approved and allowed.''
Xow, compare the actual language of the Decree, without inserts or changes, as follows:
''The settlen1ent, payments and distribution,
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to
the order herein of February 27, 1945 and as hereinabove set forth, is approved and allowed.''
(Note, again, that the Decree neither here (R. 128)
nor anywhere, mentions the "petition" or the "stipulation" and that the words "hereinabo·ve set forth" do
not refer at all to the stipulation or even the order, but
do refer to the provisions "above set forth" in the D·ecree
f.or the "payment and distribution" of the $10,000.00.
Also, that what is "approved and allowe'd" is not the
stipulation or the order but the prior provisions in the
Decree as to provisions there made for funds to complete payment of the balance of the $10,000.00.)
A brief reference to the documents mentioned by
the Court will more fully establish the· above errors :
Petition of 2-13-45:
This is referred to by the Court as a "stipulation,"
and is also more appropriately called a petition (R. 86).
It is signed by all the heirs, including the two who were
here, by themselves, and the three foreign heirs, by
their attorney representative, and also by the two administrators, as such, and by their attorneys.

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The quote'd portions of the petition are correct. But
these things are from the petition; they are not in the
order, and the word "only" as used near the end of the
opinion is added, it doesn't appear even in the petition.
And none of this that is quoted in the opinion appears in
any court order, as is erroneously asserted in the last
paragraph of the opinion.
All that is said even in the petition on this is that
"it has been agreed***subject to the approval of the
Court. That the said payment and settlement shall
become binding and conclusive as to each***upon the
acceptarnce of his portion of the said fund and the execution of the necessary instruments to receipt therefor
and to assign his said interest and release the said
estate." This is a statement that the parties were in
agreement that two things would make the settlement
binding-(1) "acceptance" of the nwney, and (2) the
"execution of the necessary instruments." And this is
a correct statement of what would make a settlement
binding, regardless of whether it had been so recited or
not, and it certainly doesn't say that the parties who
n1ade the stipulation may not themselves change the
conditions of delivery or acceptance, or that the court
may not approve such changed conditions or make other
provisions for distribution, as it did. In· fad the petition
(R. 87) petitioned, "That the court***shall dirert tlw
manner of disbursement of the said fund."
A petition means, and i~, onl~' a presentation to
the Court of something for the ( ~ourt's <·onHideration.
Plainly, everybody connected with it then believed thn t
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the $10,000.00 distribution was wanted by the heirs who
were and would be eager to get the money, and would
naturally be expected to receipt for it. Their attorney
presented pages of proof of this ( R. 243-260) to the
Court. EYerybody was convinced of it, although it was
intimated that war and revolution conditions could delay
delivery.
In the statement quoted above in "Error 1," however, the opinion goes completely off the track. The
petition doesn't say anything like this quote from the
opinion, and it certainly would have he·en an impertinence for the parties to have said "that approval***by
the court was subject" to something they might try to
impose. This is a complete reversal of fact and condition. The petition, exactly to the contrary, stated that
what was being proposed was "subject to the approval
of the***court."
So this stipulation or petition became an agreement,
if at all, only if or to the extent approved by the Court.
The Court was also petitioned that "such other orders
and conditions be made as to the Court shall seem
necessary or appropriate," so that even as to the petition
alone the opinion seems to have entirely misconstrued
its purport, character and its effect.
We are constrained to wonder why this Court goes
into such uncertain matters of interpretation at all, and
particularly why it adopts the strajned interpretations
of appellant's attorneys who were and apparently still
are, utter strangers to all the proceedings referred to.
Why do we not follow the universal rule that requires
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and permits pleadings by the parties of their positions
on these things, and proof of the surrounding circumstances, of the information that all parties possessed,
and of the purpose, conditions and intent of the parties?
The Order of 2-27-45:
This order is short and merely needs reading to
show the errors as to it.
The following positive prov1s1ons conclusively disprove the facts and conclusions as stated in the opinion.
The "administrators***are authorized and directed to
pay and distribute" to each heir, naming him, the sum
the Court approved as "a reasonable amount***considering the properties of the decendent." Then the "balance
***of the said estate" (R.96), after the payment of all
debts and expenses, "shall he distributed to Virginia
Latsis." Thus, we have a determination of heirship
and an order of partition and distribution without any
conditions therein at all.
The order does not adopt any of the language of
the petition quoted by the ·opinion here, as to the parties
being hound upon executing documents. This language
is ignored entirely by the Court and, on the contrary,
something entirely different is said as to their being
"bound," and this language also recognizes this distribution as being then made, as follows:

''It is further ORDERED that the sajd a~rrr
ment and distribution shall be binding and conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon the
acceptance by hjm, or h~· his hPi r~ at law, of said
payment~.''
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Thi~

is all. It assumes areeptance of the money, of
eonrse, but by no means conditions the order of distribution, eyen on this, ·or at all. There is nothing more
in the order about anybody being ''bound" and this is
entirely different fron1 \vhat the opinion says the order
contains. Then, and reinforcing the direct and unconditioned order ·of distribution, the Court leaves the selection of one or the other of two agencies to be used in
forwarding the money to the attorney representatives
of appellants, and then says that "delivery of checks
to such source shall relieve the administrators herein
from further responsibility therefor," i.e., for the "distribution" as ordered.
This order is in no way attacked in this proceeding
and it stands, and very far from leaving it up to any
choice of accepting this distribution or electing a different one, or from making any condition to that effect,
the order expressly directs these heirs to furnish receipts
and proper acknowledgments. It says, ''It is further
ORDERED that said heirs shall furnish***a proper
receipt," and other documents, or that their attorney
shall procure such from them. In other words, this is
a plain order that they must give these documents. Thus,
there is plainly nothing conditional in this order, nor
in the final decree. This is conclusively clear.
If either of them are defective or erroneous, they
hoth are made by a Court of competent and complete
jurisdiction and are certainly not void, or subject to
this kind of attack.

Tlw Final Decree of 10-9-45:
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· This solid, valid and clear decree (R. 127), backed
hy c01nplete jurisdiction and complete orderly probate
proceedings is here distorted and misinterpreted out
of existence, and illegally ignored.
All this without any pleaded attack on it or any
pleaded claim of what the Court has decided as to it.
First, it can be truly and directly stated that nothing
recited in the opinion as to it approving or even referring
to the stipulation is correct. Secondly, this decree nowhere approves the order of Feb. 27, 1945, although it
plainly could not possibly have had any effect in making
this decree "conditional" if it had.
It is just as plain as it can he that the decree referred
to this former order only to cover two matters relating
to funds; (1) to approve the distribution as so far
made or tendered (R. 127, par 4) and, (2) to approve
the prior provisions whereby the widow had provided
and deposited the funds to complete this $10,000.00 distribution (R. 127, par 6).. Thus it was that the "checks"
were made available to the attorney representative of
the heirs and the "sources" referred to, so as t·o relieve
the administrators, and insure complete distribution.
Thus paragraph 6 of the decree recites the fact of
this deposit for this purpose. And so the decree gives
recognition to ·the facts, (1) that a distribution previously ordered had already been partially completed,
and, (2) that funds had been securely placed to finish
it.
This is exactly what this Court in Tiller v. Norton,
253 P.2d 618 at 620, indicated should be done under
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these circumstanePs and when the final decree was
entered.
And the actual paragraph of this decree quoted
in part, and added to and changed by the opinion, didn't
refer to the February order as something "hereinabove
set forth," and it wasn't; and it didn't refer to that
order as being "approved and allowed," and it wasn't.
It would have been utterly foolish for that Court to
be then approving and allowing an order made and
entered seven or eight months before, and, of course,
it didn't purport to do this.
But plainly, what is referred to as "hereinabove set
forth" are the "payments and distribution" already made
and "provision for distribution" as in Paragraph 6 thereinabove recited, and in fact it was this that the decree
said "is approved and allowed." This was appropriate
and proper to relieve the administrators "from further
responsibility," so that their discharge could follow
therein, as it did.
The appellan ts never alleged that this decree was
conditional and the Court appears to recognize that
such a final decree to be conditional must he plainly
made so by its own terms. Otherwise no reli;1nce could
be placed on Court decrees.
And so the Court, following utterly misleading
statements in respondents' briefs, appeared to think
there was such language in this decree. There is not
only an utter absence of any such language but the
whole decree shows the plain intent that it would wind
up the probate proceeding which it said "is now (R. 128)
1
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1n condition to be closed." Whatever defects may be
claimed for this final judgment its finality is certainly
not conditioned on anything.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, that for these reasons.
a rehearing should he granted herein.
Because of the numerous complica!tions involved,
the case could not he adequately argued to the Court in
the time available and what little was presented doubtless
was largely lost track of before the decision. It is suggested that the case should be reargued, including the
matters above presented, so that the Court may have
whatever help the parties may be able to contribute.

MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER
Attorneys for Respondent

UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST COMPANY
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